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Abstract 
This article analyzes the electoral competition strategy adopted by the Brazilian presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro on 
Twitter, supported by the saliency theory – where candidates compete by emphasizing different topics and selecting 
issues from a universal agenda to focus the campaign‟s attention and efforts. The salience Bolsonaro‟s winning 
campaign attributed to values during the 2018 presidential election. Values are attitudinal guidelines related to different 
social, religious, economic, and political concepts, covering various topics on views about what is desirable or 
undesirable in a society. The study used content analysis to explore and categorize a corpus of 809 tweets posted in the 
account @jairbolsonaro. The data was mined by applying computational intelligence methods and using the public API 
and the Python Twint library. Four dimensions of cultural variance found in the World Values Survey were used to 
establish the categories: traditional values, rational-secular values, survival values, and self-expression values. The 
results show that the content of Bolsonaro‟s electoral competition strategy was based on traditional moral values and the 
campaign‟s format was developed primarily via social media. 
Keywords: Brazilian elections, issues, cultural variance, salience, Twitter 
1. Introduction 
The new contemporary media ecosystem offers channels and tools for political candidates and politicians to develop 
communication strategies and speak directly with voters. In hybrid media systems, where old and new media are 
intertwined and their logics complement each other, political actors are not restricted to official communication formats 
or mass media and can use a variety of other channels. Thus, social media platforms have been widely used in elections, 
particularly the Twitter microblogging platform. This technological tool allows users to have an account, customize a 
profile, publish and disseminate messages that may be replicated and easily retrieved, showing important 
communication and informational characteristics. Twitter allows establishing digital social networks, as it facilitates the 
representation of social actors and connections among them. These links are potential channels for disseminating ideas 
and news, forming agendas, and discussing topics. 
Twitter topics discussed among users and forming an agenda are not restricted to the social networks established on the 
platform. They reverberate in different communication channels, other social media platforms, traditional media, and 
voters‟ daily conversations.  
When considering that electoral disputes are disputes between rhetoric – the winning rhetoric is the one that convinces 
the voters – it is possible to explain the candidates‟ strategies by the saliency theory, according to which candidates 
compete emphasizing different topics (Robertson, 1976). Campaigns select issues from a universal agenda to focus 
attention and efforts, and the prominence attributed to each issue distinguishes one competitor from another. These 
differences may be based on either political preferences or value-related positions. Values are guidelines linked to 
different social, religious, economic, and political concepts structuring a wide range of attitudes (Moreno & Carballo, 
2013; Inglehart & Carballo, 2008) and referring to personal views about what is or is not desirable in a society. 
Studies conducted after the 1970s have demonstrated generational changes in values based on the human development 
theory and empirical investigations that originated the world cultural map. The map was developed by political 
scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, inspired by the World Values Survey. According to the authors, there 
was a transition from materialist goals focusing on physical security toward postmaterialist goals, emphasizing aspects 
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such as freedom of expression, environmental protection, human rights, minority rights (racial, gender immigrants, 
people with disabilities). Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and several other researchers seek to explain the process of 
changing values from the concept of marginal utility, based on Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs, studies on human 
emancipation, and considering Amartya Sen‟s approach of development as freedom. 
Inglehart (1990) uses these theoretical approaches to explain that evaluative priorities – i.e., aspects to which 
individuals attribute subjective value and define as goals– are related to objective conditions in which such priorities are 
inserted. Thus, in an environment of physical insecurity, marked by the scarcity of material conditions, the resources 
necessary for survival acquire a high marginal utility. Nevertheless, Inglehart points out that changes in a conjuncture of 
individuals‟ living conditions are not the only ones to change value priorities. The author adds the hypothesis of 
socialization to the hypothesis of scarcity to explain the process of changing values. The added hypothesis assumes that 
socialized individuals in an environment of material insecurity embody values oriented toward material issues. Changes 
in these conditions do not produce immediate changes in value priorities, but they change in the next generation, which 
is socialized in a particular type of environment (Okado & Ribeiro, 2017). 
Post-war generations emerged with a post-materialist perspective, increasingly emphasizing non-economic issues. 
Classic economic issues have not disappeared, but their relative prominence has being replaced by non-economic issues 
on the campaign platforms of Western political parties. Thus, electoral disputes changed, showing polarization between 
post-materialist and authoritarian values. Income became a much weaker indicator of public policy preferences than 
cultural issues. In the US, for example, those opposed to abortion and same-sex marriage supported Republican 
candidates at the expense of Democrats. Voters moved from class-based polarization to values-based polarization. 
However, recent studies, such as that developed by Inglehart and Norris (2017), have supported the idea of a traditional 
reaction to the postmaterialist values, which helps to explain the rise of conservative and authoritarian politicians in 
different parts of the world. Recent economic and moral changes have led to a reaction from conservative segments of 
society. Also, the exponential income reduction and increase unemployment levels, i.e., the decline in conditions of 
survival and existential security, possibly affected the way societies integrate differences, the individuals‟ political 
behavior, and confidence in democratic institutions. Therefore, a favorable context regarding the economy and security 
increases tolerance for minorities, whereas recession and insecurity have the opposite effect: they encourage 
authoritarianism as people look for leadership that rejects outsiders and political minorities. 
Also, the decline in conditions of survival and existential security may have affected the way societies integrate 
differences, the individuals‟ economic behavior, and confidence in democratic institutions. These factors, added to the 
reaction against cultural change in the face of the erosion of traditional family values, may have fueled support for 
populist authoritarian phenomena such as Brexit, the emergence of the French National Front, and the election of 
Donald Trump in the United States (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). 
In the period immediately before and during the 2018 presidential election, the Brazilian economy registered a recession 
that affected survival conditions. The economic recession started to be felt by Brazilians in 2015 with a negative 
variation in GDP and a drop in household consumption. This context impacted the labor market by reducing 
employment levels and increasing the number of people working informally. There was also an increase in extreme 
poverty in the country: in 2017, more than 15 million people were below the poverty line, which was an increase of 0.8% 
compared to 2016 (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE], 2018). 
In addition to the economic scenario, data on the importance of some values for Brazilians recorded in the World Values 
Survey of 2018 are worth mentioning when discussing the 2018 presidential election. According to the survey, religion 
was considered “very important” for 45.1% and “not at all important” for 4.7% of respondents. The item “respecting 
authority” was considered as something “good” for 70.5% and “bad” for 6.1% of respondents. As for the importance of 
family, 85.3% of respondents considered it “very important” while 0.4% as “not at all important.” Homosexuality was 
considered as “never justifiable” for 29.2% and as “always justifiable” for 18.7% of respondents. Finally, euthanasia 
was considered “never justifiable” for 55.4% and “always justifiable” for 10.3%, and abortion was considered “never 
justifiable” for 64.1% and “always justifiable” for 4.7% of respondents. 
The Latinobarometer survey conducted in 2018 indicated that the Brazilian institution with the highest level of trust was 
the Church, with 45.8% of respondents saying they have “a lot of confidence,” 26.8% “some confidence,” 17.5% “little 
confidence,” and 9.4% “no confidence at all.” Brazil has always been marked by having a large Christian religious 
population, with a growing number of Evangelicals – from more than 15.41% in 2000 to 22.16% in 2010 (IBGE, 2010). 
Data from the 2010 IBGE Demographic Census showed that Catholics and Evangelicals represent 86.78% of the 
Brazilian population. Also, the 2018 Latinobarometer estimated that Evangelicals represented approximately 26% of the 
Brazilian population. 
The theoretical framework and the collected secondary data support the hypothesis that Bolsonaro‟s electoral 
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competition strategy was based on traditional moral values in terms of content, although the Brazilian economic 
scenario justified the salience of the topic economy and survival values in the electoral agenda. As for the form, the 
campaign‟s communication strategy was developed primarily via social media, particularly the microblogging platform 
Twitter. This technological instrument allowed reverberating the candidate‟s values and positions that would not gain 
space in mass media. Therefore, this study assumes that Jair Bolsonaro‟s election in Brazil was part of a phenomenon 
that has led the far-right to power in different countries, based on a shift toward traditional moral values. 
Values have acquired an increasingly important dimension in people‟s political behavior. Therefore, as expected, values 
gained a special place in the candidates‟ political communication strategy. In this sense, it is crucial for scientific 
research to identify the values disseminated by candidates in their electoral campaigns. 
The use of Twitter has been growing exponentially in Brazil in recent years (Ideal marketing, 2018), and the platform 
was widely used during the 2018 Brazilian presidential election. As a marketing tool, it is already the second most used 
platform in the country, and 70% of internet users interviewed in a survey created by Twitter Brazil in 2018 (Brasil 
Econômico, 2018) claimed to use the microblog as a source of political information, which makes it an important 
political and electoral marketing resource. 
During the 2018 Brazilian presidential election, Jair Bolsonaro (running for the Social-Liberal Party – PSL) used 
Twitter intensively to disseminate messages and set his agenda of themes to form the national debate. The content 
comprising such an agenda is the object of this research, which seeks to analyze the cultural values that had prominence 
throughout the elected president‟s campaign on Twitter. 
2. Methods and Techniques 
This research adopted content analysis, a technique widely used in academic studies of political communication to 
classify and categorize contents. As a result, the researchers can identify key elements to frame the content and arrange 
it for comparison with other elements (Bardin, 2011; Carlomagno & Rocha, 2016). 
The units analyzed were tweets from the official Twitter account of the elected president in the 2018 Brazilian 
presidential election, Jair Bolsonaro. When the same tweet fell into more than one category, we adopted the 
quasi-sentence analysis strategy, categorizing the content that could be extracted from each of the quasi-sentences. 
The empirical investigation considered the period between July 22, 2018 (when the party – PSL – held its national 
convention officializing Jair Bolsonaro as its presidential candidate) and October 27, 2018 (the eve of the second-round 
election day). Data mining was conducted by applying Computational Intelligence methods, automatically extracting 
data from the account @jairbolsonaro, using public API and Python Twint library. The tweets from the period were 
downloaded, forming a corpus of n=809 elements, with 471 tweets corresponding to the first electoral round and 338 to 
the second round. 
We first conducted an exploratory data analysis, selecting tweets based on the research goals and the typology of value 
analysis adopted. Tweets with all types of content were considered: text, image, and sound. Videos were duly 
transcribed for analysis. Tweets that did not fit or extrapolated the purposes of this investigation were discarded. This 
material was studied in depth in previous research (Vicari & Iasulaitis, 2019; Iasulaitis &Vieira, 2019), and contained 
meta-campaign information such as promotion of the campaign‟s agenda, appeal to vote, attack on opponents, 
endorsement, and support received without valuable content. 
The next step was the categorization of each unit of analysis. The typology used was based on the dimensions of 
cross-cultural variation created by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, which support the World Values Survey. The 
two dimensions are a) the survival values versus self-expression values (x-axis); and b) traditional values versus 
rational-secular values (y-axis). 
Traditional values highlight the importance of religion, deference to authority, maintaining order, and traditional family 
values. Positions based on these values also reject divorce, euthanasia, and suicide. Abortion is never justifiable. 
Societies based on such values possess high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Secular-rational values 
emphasize the opposite, placing less emphasis on religion, family traditions, and authority. The literature has described 
the transition from the first to the second set of values as a replacement of religion and superstition with science and 
bureaucracy. 
Survival values emphasize economic and physical security and are linked to a relatively ethnocentric perspective and 
low levels of trust and tolerance. Economic and physical security is prioritized over self-expression and quality of life. 
The self-expression values represent a high priority of subjective well-being, individual expression, and quality of life. 
In these societies, the protection of freedom of expression, environmental protection practices, tolerance toward 
foreigners or migrants, individual sexual orientation, and gender equality are common attitudes. There are growing 
demands for participation in the construction of economic and political life, interpersonal trust, political moderation, 
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and a shift in values in children‟s education, as well as an emphasis on hard work toward stimulating creativity. In 
theory, the transition from survival values to self-expression values mirrors the transition from industrial to 
post-industrial societies, welcoming democratic values. 
After categorizing the tweets based on these dimensions of values, an index was calculated to compare and demonstrate 
the cultural variance in Jair Bolsonaro‟s presidential campaign: 
   
   
   
 
(1) 
 Where pv = present variables, tv = total variables, and C = category 
 
The database used and the spreadsheets resulting from the analysis are available for replication in the repository 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu. 
For the purpose of visualizing the keywords, the software Iramuteq (R Interface for Multidimensional analysis of Texts 
and Questionnaire) was used to transform the textual corpus of tags into a word cloud representing the content of the 
analyzed tweets. 
3. Results 
Jair Bolsonaro was launched as a presidential candidate on July 22, during the national convention of the Social-Liberal 
Party (PSL). The Bolsonaro-Mourão ticket, respectively, a retired Brazilian Army captain – who served seven terms as 
federal deputy – and a retired general-was presented only on August 5, given Bolsonaro‟s difficulty finding a name to 
fill the post of vice-presidential candidate. Bolsonaro‟s popularity on social media, however, had been growing in 
previous years. In 2016, he stated that he intended to run for president at any cost “whether you like it or not.” After 
Donald Trump‟s victory in the US presidential election, he asserted that “Brazil would follow the same path” in 2018. 
His controversial attitudes attracted national attention. For example, in an argument with federal deputy Maria do 
Rosário, he said she did not deserve to be raped for being “very ugly” and “not his type.”  In addition, when declaring 
his vote in favor of the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, Bolsonaro invoked the memory of Colonel 
Brilhante Ustra, a known torturer during the Brazilian military dictatorship – a period when Rousseff was arrested and 
tortured. 
Bolsonaro‟s tweets during the campaign were categorized based on the values the messages triggered. Figure 1 
demonstrates the frequency Bolsonaro used each of the values considered in this research during the period analyzed. 
According to the data, traditional values were the most used by the candidate throughout his election campaign    (I = 1), 
followed by self-expression values (I = 0.52) and, finally, survival values (I = 0.48). Secular-rational values did not score. 


























International Journal of Social Science Studies                                                      Vol. 9, No. 5; 2021 
157 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Traditional Values 
Traditional values in Bolsonaro‟s campaign on Twitter were 38% of the analyzed tweets (Figure 1). They were based on 
the ideas-forces analyzed below. The texts presented a strong defense of the traditional family in a narrative associated 
with the defense of private property. A tweet that illustrates this position shows an image of the candidate with his 
daughter, with a text saying that the family was the “fruit of our affective actions.” The text continued mentioning that 
family and private property – which is obtained when this “fruit” is “raised honestly and in a free market economy” – 
must both be protected, just like material goods, which cannot “be stolen, invaded or expropriated” (@jairbolsonaro, 
October 27, 2018). 
The defense of the traditional family was also strongly based on heteronormativity. This aspect defines the standard 
behaviors for men and women, boys and girls, regulating the way they should be raised and educated (Matos & Pinheiro, 
2012). The then-candidate tweeted a video of his sons and daughter as children, with the text: 
ATTENTION: STRONG SCENES! There is nothing wrong with teaching our children values and discipline; on the 
contrary, it is essential and enriching. The scolding by the press now is that I didn‟t dress my sons as girls, nor did I 
encourage the teaching of sex [sic] to children at school (@jairbolsonaro, August 23, 2018). 
Based on the association between the traditional family model and heteronormativity, Bolsonaro‟s narrative strategy 
was used to combat what he called “gender ideology,” or “brainwashing loaded with inversion of values” undertaken by 
left-wing governments. He used this topic to build the main criticisms directed at his opponent, presidential candidate 
Fernando Haddad, running for the Workers‟ Party (PT). Haddad was the Minister of Education from 2005 to 2012, and 
during the campaign, Bolsonaro accused him of running the ministry through an “ideological bias.” According to the 
candidate, Haddad would have created a “gay kit” in order to disseminate the “gender ideology” in schools: 
You, a father, you, a mother, do you want your child to learn sex [sic] in the classroom at the age of 6? Even [sex 
between] homo-affective [people]? Or straight [people], it doesn‟t matter. Does a father want to come home and find his 
son playing with a doll because of the school‟s influence? Unfortunately, this is true. PT wanted to impose this on 
schools (@jairbolsonaro, October 24, 2018). 
At various times Bolsonaro referred to Haddad as “the father of the gay-kit.” While Haddad denied the existence of 
such a proposal during his time as minister, Bolsonaro continued the attack, saying that the candidate was trying to 
“abort the gay-kit to avoid assuming paternity [of it]” (@jairbolsonaro, October 16, 2018). In short, the problems of 
Brazil‟s education system for Bolsonaro were “the teaching of sex [sic] in schools,” “gender ideology,” and “ideological 
indoctrination in the classroom” (@jairbolsonaro, August 01, 2018). 
While Bolsonaro introduced himself as a defender of the family, whose duty was to “preserve the innocence” of 
children (@jairbolsonaro, October 21, 2018), he built a representation of Haddad and PT as figures at the opposite pole. 
He built a campaign based on dichotomous pairs. Bolsonaro associated the corrosion of traditional values with the left 
and communism. They would be responsible for the dissemination of a set of promiscuous ideas in schools and 
universities. Thus, the notion of anti-communism was in the structure of the campaign‟s arguments. According to 
Bolsonaro, both the “class struggle” and the “destruction of values” would represent “a very well organized strategy to 
control society, and the candidate repeatedly cited Venezuela and Cuba as examples. Standing side by side with 
businesspeople, Bolsonaro urged the population to “free Brazil from the ideological clutches of the left” 
(@jairbolsonaro, October 22, 2018) and “break the machine that wants to transform us into a Venezuela” 
(@jairbolsonaro, October 10, 2018). “Socialism suffocates us on all sides, with the sole aim of molding us as „little 
lambs.‟ “Venezuela‟s problem is not about the military; it is about communism, this despicable and murderous ideology 
that famously destroys everything in its path” and asserted: “May God protect us and free us from communism!” 
(@jairbolsonaro, August 20, 2018). 
The defense of Christianity was present in the communicational strategy based on traditional values, with biblical 
passages and references to the Christian God, such as the verse of John 8:32, “Ye shall know the truth, and the truth 
shall make you free.” Furthermore, the candidate assured that he would guide his actions according to Christian 
principles and be responsible for preserving the religion. On the other hand, he claimed that his main opponent, 
Fernando Haddad, “pretended to be religious” and “throws the Bible in the trash” (@jairbolsonaro, October 26, 2018). 
Continuing the defense of traditional values, the candidate made the fight against abortion a central topic: “from the 
beginning, we are against abortion” (@jairbolsonaro, October 17, 2018). Also, he reinforced that “whenever it depends 
on me, proposals to allow abortion in Brazil will have my veto and Brazilian money will not fund nonprofits that 
promote this practice” (@jairbolsonaro, October 12, 2018), and the hashtag #BrasilContraOAborto (Brazil against 
abortion) was used several times. 
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The presidential candidate exalted authority in all its forms, be it the army or the military police. Bolsonaro constantly 
claimed his appreciation for law and order:  
Every citizen, to enjoy their full rights, must obey the laws and fulfill their duties. Anyone in the national territory, even 
if they are not a Brazilian citizen, has inalienable rights as a human being, as well as a duty to obey the Brazilian laws 
(@jairbolsonaro, October 27, 2018). 
We have the foundations and the right people to finally bring to our country the values printed on our green and yellow 
flag: Order and Progress! (@jairbolsonaro, September 18, 2018). 
Bolsonaro thus constructed a narrative that he would ultimately be defending the nation by defending traditional moral 
values. In this sense, special emphasis was given to a strategy of linking his image to that of a nationalist candidate, 
built through pro-nation slogans and using patriotic symbols. 
When commenting on the demonstrations for his support, he wrote that they were “pro-Brazil and they say #PTNo” 
(@jairbolsonaro, October 21, 2018), positioning the Workers‟ Party as a national enemy to be fought. Thus, nationalism, 
the central resource explored in the tweets analyzed, intended to exalt the country and associate his candidacy with a 
salvationist strategy. “It is not for Bolsonaro, but for Brazil.” The country, in his narrative, would have been “robbed 
and left to rot” by previous governments. 
[It is] Time to reclaim our pride of being Brazilian; to hang our green and yellow flag in our homes; to redeem our right 
to come and go; We are just a few steps from greatness! Brazil above everything, God above everyone! (@jairbolsonaro, 
October 2, 2018). 
Using a nationalist discourse, the candidate called for national unity to legitimize a national project aimed at the 
majorities, which is evident in a video he published on October 21, 2018, in which all elements analyzed above are 
present: “We are the majority! We are the real Brazil!”, where he expressed his contempt for the opposition and, 
ultimately, its elimination: “If they want to stay here, this gang will have to put themselves under the law of all of us; 
either they go out, or they go to jail. These red criminals will be banned from our homeland.” He used the expression 
“end of the beach,” which refers to a specific region in Brazil where people were tortured during the military 
dictatorship. He defended the criminalization of social movements and the classification of such activity as terrorism: 
Petralhada [depreciatively referring to PT supporters], you should all go to „the end of the beach.‟ You will have no 
space in our homeland because I will cut off all your perks! [...]. It will be a cleanup never seen in the history of Brazil. 
These lazy bums will have to work! The demagogy with the Brazilian people will end. You will see the institutions 
being recognized; you will see proud armed forces that will collaborate for Brazil‟s future. You, Petralhada, will have 
the civil and military police with legal rearguard to enforce the law. Criminals from MST [landless workers‟ movement], 
criminals from MTST [homeless workers‟ movement], your actions will be typified as terrorism. You will no longer 
terrorize [the population in] the countryside or cities. Either you fit in and submit to the laws, or go to jail together with 
the „cachaceiro‟ [or „drunk man,‟ depreciatively referring to former President Lula da Silva, who was serving time in 
jail at that time after a controversial trial] in [the city of ] Curitiba [...]. We love our families, we respect our children, 
we respect all religions. We do not want socialism; we want to be apart from dictatorships around the world. 
(@jairbolsonaro, October 21, 2018). 
It is noteworthy that Bolsonaro‟s campaign did not show any post-materialist value in the dimension of secular-rational 
values. In the y-axis, all tweets were categorized as traditional values. The candidate understood post-materialist values 
that could be framed as rational-secular values as “value inversion” put forward by the left-wing. According to the 
narrative, these “politically correct” values would lead to a chaotic society that would justify the action of a “Mother 
State,” operating to control people and reduce personal liberty. 
4.2 Values of Self-Expression 
A large part of the tweets that were categorized into “values of self-expression” (33% of posts in the microblogging 
platform) can be evaluated as the candidate‟s “immunization” against controversies, where positive messages about 
specific niches of voters were published after Bolsonaro made negative and controversial statements/comments toward 
them. In this sense, the candidate praised women and the culture of the Brazilian Northeast region, disseminating 
messages reinforcing his commitment to increasing safety for women and the LGBT community. He also sought to 
build an image of being popular among black and Brazilian pardo voters to ease the weight of sexist, racist, 
homophobic, and xenophobic statements the candidate made in other moments of his political history or even during the 
2018 elections. 
In this sense, the Northeast was the Brazilian region that received the most attention from the candidate in his tweets. In 
one of them, he declared that “the essence of the northeastern people is one of the main beautiful forms of cultural 
diversity in Brazil. Thanks to these men and women, Brazil is a giant today.” When criticized for opportunistic behavior, 
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he replied by saying that his father-in-law is from Ceará (Brazilian state in the Northeast region) and his daughter, 
therefore, has origins in the region (she has “the Northeast in her blood”). After controversial statements about the 
population from the Northeast and social relief programs, the candidate started to defend the conditional cash transfer 
program Bolsa Família, promising to “support” and “expand” the program, “combat fraud,” and ensure “the correct 
implementation.” Thus, Bolsonaro sought to prepare voters for the impact of videos circulating on social media, 
showing him criticizing Bolsa Família and making prejudiced comments when referring to the people from the 
Northeast – as in an interview given to Record News in 2012, when he stated that “Bolsa Família is a lie, in the 
Northeast you can‟t get a person to work in your house,” or in October 2014, when he declared: “You see girls in the 
Northeast, they slap their hands on their pregnant belly and say: „– there is also the birth-related social benefit. And this 
one [the baby] will give us a refrigerator; this one will give us a washing machine.‟ And then these people do not want 
to work!” In a live-streamed conversation in 2016, Bolsonaro said, “There is a guy from Ceará… a big head [an insult 
directed at northeastern people in Brazil] here by my side. Man, I think his stomach is bigger than his head.” 
In his tweets during the campaign, women were portrayed as “crucial in the development of our Brazil.” According to 
the candidate‟s narrative, women have the inherent role of preserving family values and educating children. 
He stated that, as a deputy, he presented “many bills [...] in defense of women,” and tweeted that “after four men, a girl 
changed my life!” statement made in April 2017, when he said that after four men, he “got weak” and then he had a 
daughter. 
In addition to trying to ease the image of being sexist, he argued that his bill 5242/13 – which considers crimes of 
passion as heinous crimes, regardless of their sexual nature – also aimed to protect the LGBT community. About the 
LGBT community, Bolsonaro challenged the data on deaths due to homophobia released in the press, saying that this 
community is treated “as an ideological tool.” In November 2010, however, he argued that violence would be the best 
way to deal with deviant sexualities: “When your son starts to get a little gay, you should spank him, so he changes his 
behavior.” 
Another example of “immunizing” the audience is his tweet about racial equality: “When I was considered to be the 
President of the Commission on Human Rights [Chamber of Deputies] in 2014, I made it clear: if chosen, I would be 
„colorblind,‟ everyone would be the same color! We must fight so that we are equal before the law.” In April 2017, he 
insulted quilombolas by making a comment that, in addition to being offensive, had racist content: “I went to a 
quilombo in Eldorado Paulista [name of the region]. Look, the lightest Afro-descendant guy there weighed seven 
arrobas. They do nothing! I don‟t think he even serves for breeding.” 
In order to “immunize” voters against the proposal to end the demarcation of indigenous lands, he published a video 
with the caption “Indigenous from Tribo Xingu visits Jair Bolsonaro and learns about his real proposals, free from the 
lies made up by PT. Brazil belongs to all of us!” (@jairbolsonaro, October 26, 2018). 
The candidate frequently used the strategy of attributing the negative elements related to his image concerning women, 
black people, indigenous people, workers, people with disabilities, and the population from the Northeast of Brazil, to 
fake news produced by PT. He claimed that PT was desperate because they were losing the elections, saying that the 
party “cowardly” disseminated lies about him: “What a crook and brazen-faced one has to be to go around saying they 
are a victim of fake news while scattering to the four winds that I [when he was federal deputy] voted [bills] against 
disabled people, that I am going to raise taxes for the poor, get rid of Bolsa Família [conditional cash transfer program], 
abolish maternity leave, the bonus salary, and disseminating a bunch of other lies?” (@jairbolsonaro, October 19, 2018). 
Bolsonaro denounced what he called an “orchestrated movement forging aggressions to harm our campaign” 
(@jairbolsonaro, October 11, 2018), declaring that the attempt to link his figure to Nazism would be “another of the 
many lies” spread about him; by equating Nazism with communism, he claimed to repudiate both. He also intended to 
remove the focus from his previous sexist messages, when pointing out in PT‟s campaign: “They talk about inequality 
of wages between men and women and they want to say that I‟ll be responsible for that, even when I am defending the 
equality already provided for by law. The Workers‟ Party governed Brazil for almost 15 years. Why did they not solve 
this problem?” (@jairbolsonaro, October 08, 2018). 
Therefore, several tweets are categorized in this dimension of values because they reflect some sort of respect toward 
political minorities and tolerance for differences. However, these manifestations are used as a strategy to contrast the 
candidate‟s offensive speeches in previous situations. 
Another idea-force in the post-materialist dimension of Bolsonaro‟s campaign was the defense of freedom of expression, 
especially on the Internet, “because it is about freedom of expression and it is up to people to decide what to believe, 
filtering and seeking information.” This perspective was used to oppose mass media. According to the candidate, the 
large broadcast corporations defamed his image because of their “promiscuous relations” with the left-wing, 
manifesting attitudes “harmful to information and democracy.” In several tweets, Bolsonaro accused the newspapers of 
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being “side by side with those who threaten your freedom the most.” For him, this was part of a “process of 
implementing a totalitarian state” (@jairbolsonaro, October 10, 2018). For him, the press was “infiltrated [by left-wing 
journalists],” and its current role consisted of “disinforming and deceiving people,” “working against Brazilians”: 
“Those who do not read the newspaper are not informed. Anyone who reads is misinformed.” 
He also stated that personal liberties were threatened, indicating his websites and social media accounts as safe sources 
of information. The candidate claimed he was subject to persecution and that there was a movement of censorship 
against the right-wing, launching a campaign to raise awareness of this issue using the hashtag “#DireitaAmordaçada” 
(the right-wing is gagged). For him, “the essence” of his adversaries in the electoral dispute would be “to silence those 
who think differently,” inspired by countries with authoritarian central governments (@jairbolsonaro, October 19, 
2018). 
In this sense, the candidate vehemently defended freedom on the Internet: “freedom on the Internet and [freedom of the] 
press, which we have always defended, unlike the others [other candidates] who claim they need regulation!” 
(@jairbolsonaro, August 09, 2018). “Contrary to what our opponents propose, WE ARE AGAINST ANY KIND OF 
SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MEDIA AND INTERNET” (@jairbolsonaro, October 11, 2018). 
Bolsonaro‟s self-expression values observed during the two rounds of the presidential campaign, therefore, indicate an 
image associated with some post-materialist values a) to reduce his rejection within specific groups; and b) to defend 
freedom of expression on the Internet. 
4.3 Survival Values 
The category “survival values” (29% of tweets) encompassed a set of ideas-forces specified below. For the candidate, 
the recovery of economic security in the country would be associated with minimum state intervention and 
implementation of neoliberal proposals, such as the privatization of state-owned companies, presented as the best 
alternatives for the countries‟ economic recovery and the increase in citizens‟ purchasing power. The presidential 
candidate stated he would pursue measures such as “reducing the tax burden, reducing bureaucracy, and deregulation” 
and added that “free market and fewer taxes is my motto in the economy!” 
I committed to reducing the number of ministries, extinguishing and privatizing a large part of the existing state-owned 
companies. They are unnecessary expenses that must serve the population. Refusing to make deals that involve offering 
positions [in state-owned companies] in exchange for [political] support is already part of this objective 
(@jairbolsonaro, September 21, 2018). 
The defense of a minimal and efficient state is based on economic freedom. In his view, this minimal state would 
guarantee high productivity and competition, fostering the individuals‟ consumption and entrepreneurship. Thus, the 
free market was indispensable. This set of proposals could, according to Bolsonaro, reduce the country‟s high 
unemployment rates: “Countries with more economic freedom in the world have meager unemployment rates. We will 
follow this course. We will create jobs like never before! [...] Brazil will be a great nation!” (@jairbolsonaro, October 
25, 2018). The candidate also proposed an administrative reform, which would include “facilitating the opening of 
companies, attracting investments” and “reducing and simplifying taxes” (@jairbolsonaro, October 10, 2018). 
Also, in the economic aspect, the campaign was in direct opposition with the Workers‟ Party. For Bolsonaro, PT was 
responsible for the loss of confidence of investors in Brazil, causing the economic recession: “Investors do not trust 
Brazil, thousands of companies shut their operations due to violence, high taxes, bureaucracy, corruption, and crisis, all 
inherited from the PT. We will change this picture” (@jairbolsonaro, October 25, 2018). Bolsonaro suggested that PT 
formed a government through nominations “based on relationships with unions,” leading to a “bankrupted and corrupt 
system” (@jairbolsonaro, October 11, 2018). He stated that candidate Fernando Haddad intended to create more taxes 
and increase already existing taxes. 
The fight against corruption was approached in terms of survival values, as it was at the heart of the explanation for the 
loss of resources and for the deprivation of a considerable portion of Brazilian society. Bolsonaro mentioned several 
times the corruption scandals and the Operation Car-Wash – the investigation of the biggest corruption scandal in Brazil 
– stimulating the atmosphere of anti-PT, associating the party to “a machine of corruption and lies” (@jairbolsonaro, 
October 22, 2018). Former President Lula da Silva was referred to as the “corrupt inmate chief” (@jairbolsonaro, 
October 23, 2018), and Haddad was nicknamed “Andrade” and “puppet of the corrupt.” Taking advantage of the crisis 
scenario, Bolsonaro sought to channel popular energy against PT, which became a “scapegoat,” configuring “one of the 
most traditional political mechanisms to alleviate the hatred and frustrations of sections of society” (Messenberg, 2017, 
our translation). Stating that the taxes paid by the population were being used to finance “socialist dictatorships around 
the world,” the candidate reinforced the image of Brazil as “a country devastated by the biggest corruption scandals in 
history, led by my opponent‟s party. His leader gives orders from jail, he is in prison for corruption” (@jairbolsonaro, 
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October 23, 2018). Linking the fight against corruption to nationalism, he released images produced in the colors of the 
national flag containing messages such as: 
We want to promote a cultural transformation in our country, where impunity, corruption, and crime will no longer be 
associated with our national identity. The law and the constitution will be our instruments. Justice will be independent 
and must accelerate the punishment of the guilty! (@jairbolsonaro, October 13, 2018). 
As an equally important discursive strategy, Bolsonaro claimed there was a coordination between the left-wing parties 
PT and PSOL regarding the attack he suffered on September 06, 2018, while in campaign activities in the city of Juiz de 
Fora (MG): 
Voluntary support is something that PT does not know and does not accept. They always exercise politics by buying the 
people‟s opinion. One of the former members of his support party, PSOL, tried to murder me. We are a threat to the 
most corrupt people in Brazil‟s history. Together we will rescue our country! (@jairbolsonaro, October 18, 2018). 
The feeling of existential insecurity was also addressed by the candidate in his tweets: “citizens [are] hostages in their 
own homes,” “people are trapped inside their own homes,” “There is no victim of society! SOCIETY IS THE VICTIM!” 
(@jairbolsonaro, August 28, 2018), “We want to give back to the population the pleasure of walking down the street 
without fear, of living without fear. Our enemy is the crime, not the citizen!” (@jairbolsonaro, October 9, 2018). 
Bolsonaro‟s proposals were associated with the fight against violence and crime, involving the repeal of the 
firearm-control legislation (Disarmament Statute) and strong messages regarding the need to intensify the police force 
and tighten the way lawbreakers are treated. The candidate was straightforward when introducing himself as being in 
favor of reducing the age of criminal responsibility, against the concessions for prisoners to leave prison on specific 
dates temporarily, and against disarmament. Frequently claiming that the country suffers from “60,000 homicides a year” 
and “more than 50,000 women raped,” in addition to reporting several cases of murdered police officers, he intended to 
generate collective indignation that he could use to present his position as a strong candidate, the only one capable of 
“firmly facing the criminals” and truly “concerned with honest people.” To consolidate this position, Bolsonaro wrote 
that he represented a threat “to the corrupt, criminals, rapists, to schemes made up to rob from the BNDES [National 
Development Bank], the murderers, and those who want to destroy Brazil” (@jairbolsonaro, October 26, 2018). He 
added that these groups were “desperate” because they would not be left in peace in his government. 
He stated that the country suffered from a “damned legacy of violence left by previous governments” (@jairbolsonaro, 
October 23, 2018), i.e., PT was responsible for the high crime rates in Brazil. He argued that previous governments 
created a “criminal structure,” defined by “impunity” and the “privileging criminals.” Bolsonaro did not spare 
adjectives to relate the Workers‟ Party to violence and criminality: “they affronted justice, disrespected families, and 
threw the country in violence and chaos” (@jairbolsonaro, October 18, 2018). 
Bolsonaro published a series of images comparing his government proposals with the government proposals by 
Fernando Haddad, whom he referred to as “the follower of a corrupt prisoner,” in an attempt to offer evidence that the 
opposition would not be committed to fighting violence and would even be colluding with criminals. He pointed out 
that, while Haddad was in favor of “police demilitarization” and the “reduction of the prison mass in Brazil through the 
release of inmates,” he was committed to guaranteeing “zero tolerance for crime, and reduction of the age of criminal 
responsibility.” Also, he was committed to “arresting and leaving criminals in jail, ending the possibility of progression 
of sentence and temporary release.” The tweets below illustrate how PT was accused of being negligent regarding 
violence: 
My opponent said he is going to fight incarceration and release criminals from jail. Our concern and priority are good 
people. I have always said that I prefer a jail full of criminals to a cemetery full of innocents. If space is lacking, we can 
build more! (@jairbolsonaro, October 9, 2018). 
If you Google “minor rapes” or “minor kills,” you will find hundreds of crimes of this nature in Brazil in recent years. 
PT and PcdoB [Brazilian communist party], and their female federal deputies, voted AGAINST the arrest of minors 
who rape and kill. We‟ve always been in favor! (@jairbolsonaro, October 11, 2018). 
The candidate, who used a gun as an imagery icon of his campaign to support the proposal to amend Law 10.826 that 
regulates the sale and possession of firearms in national territory, declared that Brazil was living a war in which “only 
one side can shoot.” Arguments in this sense can be observed in the examples below: 
About [those saying] “bullets do not solve [the problem]”: Flowers do not guarantee peace. When the “saints” who 
repeat this slogan stop going around with their armored cars and armed security guards. Then I will start to believe in 
their proposals. (@jairbolsonaro, August 30, 2018). 
CRIMINALS armed to the teeth shooting innocent men, women, and children [represent a problem that] can only be 
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solved with a bullet. Those who do not consider this a fact ignore the very reality we live in, and this is a sign that 
everything will remain the same. We understand [the problem] and will seek change! (@jairbolsonaro, August 08, 
2018). 
The core values used in Bolsonaro‟s campaign can be observed based on the word cloud built from the tweets (Figure 2. 























Figure 2. Word cloud of Tweets 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study analyzed the issues and values that gained salience in the communication strategy and electoral competition 
model adopted by President-elected Jair Bolsonaro‟s campaign on Twitter in 2018. The results obtained after categorizing 
the corpus of tweets in different dimensions of cultural variance showed that the candidate‟s campaign prioritized 
traditional values, emphasizing moral values, the defense of the traditional and heteronormative family, the Christian 
religion, and deference to all forms of authority to suppress behaviors considered immoral. These elements were 
coordinated from a narrative of nationalism-salvation, where the candidate – at the same time as he attributed the 
corrosion of traditional values to the left-wing and his main opponent, the candidate running for the Workers‟ Party, 
Fernando Haddad – assigned himself the mission of saving and rescuing the nation, which was, according to the narrative, 
haunted by the evils of communism and plagued by immorality. 
The nationalism-salvation discourse was part of an attempt to build an environment uniting different social segments to 
“return the nation to the good citizens.” In this sense, the campaign widely used national symbols observed particularly in 
the slogan “Brazil above everything, God above everyone,” and the colors of the logo and campaign material alluding to 
the Brazilian national flag. Nationalism has historically been considered an effective weapon and “a singularly strange 
and powerful force that summons peoples to harness their destinies” (Bonavides, 1964, our translation). However, history 
shows that this “noble idea” has been misrepresented countless times by Brazilian integralism or by the totalitarianism of 
Hitler and Mussolini, who adopted this notion to disseminate the hatred among nations and to dominate free peoples with 
disastrous consequences for humanity. The same nationalist and patriotic narrative observed in Bolsonaro‟s campaign in 
2018 can be observed in other moments in history. During the 1930s, the Nazis chartskillfully appropriated a verse of the 
lyrics of the German national anthem, Deutschland über alles (Germany above all), turning it into a partisan slogan to 
provide national identification. At the same time, Brazilian integralists, led by Plínio Salgado, were inspired by European 
Nazi-Fascism, and created the march in the name of “God, Fatherland, and Family.” 
An analysis of the pre-election national context, considering the data from the World Values Survey, allows a better 
understanding of the strategy adopted. The survey showed that the percentage of Brazilians who were very proud of their 
nationality had dropped considerably in the years before 2018. Thus, it was strategically efficient to create a 
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representation of the nation that needed to be heroically rescued and protected. This representation supported the 
messianic narrative around Bolsonaro, who would be the bearer of a noble mission. Thus, nationalism in the elected 
candidate‟s campaign was part of a discursive persuasion strategy and not a programmatic element. 
Even amid an economic crisis, Bolsonaro‟s campaign strategy did not highlight survival values. The index of content in 
the survival values dimension was much lower than the content in the dimensions of traditional values and self-expression 
values. As for the latter dimension, the content was restricted to advocating freedom of expression on the Internet, a 
strategy that complemented the candidate‟s narrative of being persecuted by the mass media players. It also worked as a 
way of “immunizing,” or minimizing rejection after Bolsonaro‟s controversial statements about a specific electoral niche 
such as women, black people, non-heteronormative people, indigenous peoples, and the population from Brazil‟s 
Northeast region, and migrants. 
Although the electoral scenario of 2018 pointed out the economic crisis and government accounts as central issues in 
politics – even being the main agenda topics in the narrative of the other candidates during the first presidential debate – 
the topic of the economy was strategically addressed in a tangential form by Bolsonaro‟s campaign. As observed in the 
literature, periods of economic recession can trigger a decrease in tolerance, mobilizing traditional reactions toward 
post-materialist values and making voters more likely to support authoritarian leaders. Thus, Bolsonaro simply described 
his economic proposal as “deregulating and de-bureaucratizing,” adding, even on the eve of his candidacy‟s launch, that 
he “did not understand economics” (Congresso Em Foco, 2018). As a result, the economic proposal defended most 
vigorously by the candidate was to defeat the Workers‟ Party, blamed for the crisis. 
These elements make up a mythical plot of salvationism, where the candidate presented himself as the “messiah,” bearer 
of a mission to rescue the nation, plagued by corruption and the deep economic crisis. He would be the only one to rescue 
traditional values and guarantee survival and existential security to Brazilians. Therefore, Bolsonaro presented himself as 
an anti-establishment actor and an agent of change – mirroring the strategies of other leaders recently elected in other 
countries. He took the position as the main driver of the political world, or even the people‟s redeemer, showing an 
attitude with a high degree of personification, enhanced by the communication formats granted by social media. 
It was possible to identify that Bolsonaro‟s electoral campaign model was based on an extreme version of conservatism, 
which could be better classified as reactionary. His campaign focused primarily on the conservative voter, uncomfortable 
with the emergence of post-materialist values (such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and racial quotas). These voters are 
likely to accept the notion of mobilizing the state apparatus – using force, if necessary – to react to “uncomfortable 
changes” for the sake of returning to a nostalgic past (Teixeira, 2010). An indication of the increase in conservative voters 
was the growth of Evangelicals in the population, considering the characteristics of 87% of Brazilians who are 
Evangelicals and Christian in general. As seen in this article, the 2018 World Values Survey data show that Brazilians 
considered religion as “very important” and the church as the most reliable institution; the population rejected abortion 
and agreed with high levels of authority, as well as valuing the patriarchal nuclear family. Hence, the survey‟s data 
indicated a favorable environment for Bolsonaro‟s campaign to emphasize traditional values. 
Bolsonaro assumed the position of an ultra-conservative candidate regarding the customs and rights of minorities, 
standing out from the other candidates. In general, electoral campaign models converge the strategies targeting the 
average voter, with a tendency to take extreme positions for differentiation purposes. Bolsonaro‟s campaign in 2018 
focused on such positions, considering the Brazilian multiparty context, whose centrifugal incentives can lead parties to 
widen their ideological distinction when communicating with voters. 
Hence, the study‟s hypothesis was confirmed since the campaign‟s strategy polarized post-materialist values with 
traditional and authoritarian values. Bolsonaro‟s electoral campaign strategy was based on traditional moral values 
regarding the content, even though the Brazilian economic scenario justified that the theme economy and survival values 
should be the central issues in the electoral agenda. As for the campaign‟s format, Bolsonaro‟s communication strategy 
was developed primarily on social media, particularly on Twitter, a technological tool that allows disseminating values 
and positions that would not have space in mass media. 
Bolsonaro‟s anti-political discourses – as observed in the empirical data presented – violated the codes of political 
language by transgressing norms of courtesy and self-control and introducing elements of colloquial speech (Iasulaitis, 
Braga & Seleghim, 2019). This was the very reason for their dissemination, primarily, on digital social networks, 
specifically on Twitter, a platform integrating a broad ecosystem of media, and an appropriate channel for this new format 
of politics that escapes the gatekeepers‟ control and allows widespread dissemination and repercussion. The specialized 
literature such as Ernst, Blassing, Engesser, Büchel and Esser (2019), demonstrates that Twitter has been prioritized by 
authoritarian politicians, as it makes it possible to bypass the filters of traditional mass media gatekeepers. It establishes 
direct communication with constituents, where candidates introduce themselves with reduced external interference, 
setting up their own agenda and disseminating the narratives with less influence from traditional communication 
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channels. 
The findings obtained in this study corroborated the theoretical framework, suggesting a renewal in authoritarian 
discourse, both regarding content – with emphasis on moral values and the structure of society rather than economic 
aspects – and in the format – with the dissemination of political positions via social media and digital platforms. The 
electoral success of Jair Bolsonaro‟s campaign in 2018 can be understood as part of a phenomenon that has led far-right 
leaders to power in different contexts by grounding their political message on traditional moral values. 
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